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The IEEE Standards Association is developing a standard to 
deal with the problem of managing risks that can be caused by 
electromagnetic (EM) disturbances, which will not rely solely on 
immunity testing, making it a new type of EMC standard. 
Where failures in electronic equipment can cause Functional 
Safety or other risks to be higher than considered acceptable at 
any time during its lifecycle, the proportion of those failures that 
could be caused by electromagnetic (EM) disturbances must be 
taken into account as part of the Risk Management process. 
However, immunity testing alone is incapable of providing 
sufficient design confidence, however much the test levels are 
increased, and this paper describes why and the reasons for this 
new IEEE standard. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Most of the EMC testing industry worldwide appears to 
believe that EMC testing covers everything that is needed 
regarding protection from EM disturbances, and – if there 
are Functional Safety or other risk management issues – all 
that is required is to increase the levels on the immunity 
tests by enough to create a (so-called) “Safety Margin”. 
The author debunked this myth at the IEEE EMC Sym-
posium in 2004 [1] and again in [2], but it is still a wide-
spread myth so – with the work on the new IEEE Standard 
on “Techniques and Measures to Manage Risks with Re-
gard to Electromagnetic Disturbances” [3] getting under-
way this year it seems timely to revisit the reasons why no 
amount of immunity testing, whatever the test levels used, 
can demonstrate that a digital device or system can have 
low-enough risks from EM disturbances to be used in Func-
tional Safety or other risk-managed applications.   
II. DETERMINING THE EM ENVIRONMENT   
Functional safety risk levels are measured in parts-per-
million (ppm) per person per year, with the UK's Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE, www.hse.gov.uk) requiring a 
cost/benefit analysis based on the value of the lives saved 
by improving the design if the risk of death exceeds 1 
ppm/person/year.  
In any safety-related electronic system there are many 
possible contributors to a dangerous failure, so the risks due 
to EM disturbances alone are generally set at 1/10th of the 
overall risk target. For example if the risk of death target is 
1 ppm/person/year then the target for the risk due to EM 
disturbances alone would generally be set at 0.1 
ppm/person/year. Because EMI causes systematic failure 
modes (rather than random) the “design confidence” that 
EM disturbances will not cause a person to be killed in a 
year would need to be set to 99.99999%. 
Some of the most dangerous occupations have been esti-
mated by the HSE to have risks of death around 1000 
ppm/person/year, and following  the usual method a risk 
target of 100 ppm/person/year would be allocated, due to 
EM disturbances alone, a design confidence of 99.99%. 
This level of confidence should be compared with the 
confidence in knowing what the real-world EM environ-
ment of any given system will be, over its entire lifecycle.   
The normal EMC immunity test standards, for example 
as listed under the European Union’s EMC Directive, are 
claimed to cover 80-95% (depending on the standards team 
member one talks to) of the typical daily/weekly EM dis-
turbances in a typical application. But even 95% confidence 
in setting a test level is a far cry from the 99.99% or better 
required to help prove a system was safe enough.  
Also, because they only cover typical daily/weekly EM 
disturbances, the effects of lightning and other rare EM dis-
turbances are excluded although they would certainly be 
expected to occur during any typical lifecycle.  
(The author fails to understand why these test standards 
still do not cover the very close proximity (e.g. closer than 
25 mm) of cellphones and other personal electronic devices 
containing low-power radio transmitters, even though this 
has become a commonplace situation and with the Internet 
of Things (IoT) will soon become ubiquitous.) 
Some industries (notably the military) specify EMC im-
munity test standards based on their measurements of their 
EM environments, including lightning and other rare or un-
predictable EM disturbances – but even they would surely 
balk at claiming their standards covered 99.99% of a speci-
fied EM environment for a year or more. 
In the next few years alone, the following general chang-
es to EM environments are confidently expected: 
• Roll-out of 5G cellphone systems with 100-times the 
data bandwidth of current benchmarks is expected to 
be well-underway by 2020, but its frequency ranges, 
modulation types and RF power levels, and how 
close the basestations will be to each other, are still 
  
unknown.  
• Switching power converters will operate at frequen-
cies 10 to 100 times faster due to the use of Silicon 
Carbide or Gallium Nitride devices, significantly re-
ducing their size, cost and waste heat which will in 
turn increase their use in many more applications, 
including all domestic appliances. Unfortunately, 
switching faster will also make them noisier, at 
much higher frequencies. 
• Switching power converters will increasingly be 
connected to the AC power grid due to the increasing 
take-up of alternative energy generation (e.g. photo-
voltaic), both small and large-scale, making the 
power grid noisier. 
• LED lighting will replace most incandescent and 
fluorescent lighting, using switch-mode power con-
version that is much noisier than those technologies. 
• Wireless Power Transfer (WPT) will use switching 
power converters to generate magnetic fields to cou-
ple with remote devices with sizes up to and includ-
ing automobiles, trucks, buses and trams. Up to 50% 
of these noisy fields will not couple with their target 
devices and will “leak” into the environment. Close 
proximity to WPT chargers will expose devices to 
intense disturbances, and it would be very difficult 
indeed to ensure that this cannot happen. 
• The use of PowerLine Telecommunications (e.g. 
Broadband over PowerLine, BPL) is increasing, with 
ever-higher data rates. 
• The use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is 
increasing, with powerful fields generated near to 
their Readers. 
• Machine-to-Machine (M2M) wireless datacomunica-
tions is expected to increase dramatically due to so-
called Industry 4.0 and the IoT. 
• Automobile safety systems will increasingly use 
steered radar beams of a few watts at frequencies in-
cluding 76GHz, and modern silicon devices at 28nm 
or less are becoming increasingly susceptible to such 
frequencies. 
• AC electrical power networks will increasingly suf-
fer harmonic and interharmonic waveform distor-
tion/noise as linear loads continue to be replaced by 
non-linear loads such as rectifiers and switching 
power converters.  
• Software-controlled radio will make better use of the 
limited radio spectrum by filling up any “empty” 
slots in the spectrum. The radio spectrum will even-
tually be entirely filled with frequency-hopping 
transmissions, for most of the time. 
• Experts estimate that the IoT will consist of almost 
50 billion objects by 2020 [4], and most of these will 
communicate using wireless datacommunications. 
It is clear that it is impossible to know, with any suitable 
degree of confidence, what types of EM disturbances should 
be tested, and the test levels to use, to be capable of demon-
strating that EM disturbances cannot cause unacceptable 
levels of risk during a lifecycle. Figure 1 attempts to show 
this problem graphically. 
Figure 1   The problem of predicting the future EM environment with sufficient accuracy for managing risks measured in ppm/year  
  
III. THE UNTESTABLE NUMBER OF DIGITAL STATES  
For at least 30 years it has been impossible to test more 
than a tiny fraction of all the possible digital states that a 
microprocessor and its software could get into, see [5] [6] 
and [7]. The author understands that the state of the art in 
2013 was that Microsoft could fully test all the states of a 
printer driver. Even with the fastest test system in the world, 
fully testing many microprocessors or software programs 
would require millions of years, possibly billions.  
When testing linear electronic systems, testing a percent-
age of possible states makes it possible to predict the behav-
iors of the untested ones. Unfortunately, all digital systems 
are non-linear, which means that even if it was possible to 
test 99% of all their possible states, the test results could not 
be extrapolated to provide any reliable information about 
the behavior of the remaining 1%, see [8]. 
This results in a well-known problem: digital systems can 
fail in an unpredictable manner as the direct result of un-
tested combinations of perfectly correct inputs, [9]. For ex-
ample, if a digital system had four inputs each digitized to 
8-bit accuracy, plus sixteen binary inputs (either on or off), 
and all inputs were independent of each other, there would 
be 241 possible combinations of correct inputs, about 2·1012. 
At 100 nanoseconds per test it would take 2·105 seconds to 
test them all – about 2.3 days (if testing 24/7).  
Of course, there are many more system states than are re-
quired for just the “input space”, not least to handle the pro-
cessing of the input data, and to discover whether EMI 
could cause an unsafe error or malfunction by immunity 
testing alone would require each EMC test to be applied in 
turn to all possible system states. However, limiting our ex-
ample to the input space alone, when performing a radiated 
immunity test (e.g. to IEC 61000-4-3) the lowest frequency 
would be set at the correct level (taking measurement uncer-
tainty into account), and the test would dwell at that fre-
quency while the complete set of correct input states was 
exercised. For the simple example system above, this would 
take 2.3 days. Then the test frequency would be stepped 1% 
higher for another 2.3 days, and 230 such steps would cover 
one decade of frequency, taking nearly 1.5 years, 24/7. The 
whole process would then be repeated with three other an-
gles of incidence, and again with 90° antenna polarization. 
So even the simple example system discussed earlier 
would need 12 years of EMC testing (24/7) to perform an 
IEC 61000-4-3 test covering just one frequency decade, on 
its “input space” alone.  
Assuming all of the digital states (not just input space) 
could be tested in 5 days, and testing conducted RF immun-
ity on two cable ports from 100kHz to 100MHz; radiated 
disturbances from 100MHz to 10GHz; EFT/B at four test 
levels on one cable, and four test levels of ESD on 10 test 
points would need about 58 years of testing, 24/7.  
Of course, this is all a gross simplification: clever testing 
techniques might be able to be used to reduce the testing 
time; and it might also be possible to speed up the testing of 
the system states. Assume that “intelligent” digital testing 
techniques reduce the number of states to be tested by 10 
(without, of course, compromising our design confidence of 
between 99.99% and 99.99999%); this simple example of a 
safety-related system could be EMC tested in about 6 years. 
Although most EMC test laboratories would be very 
pleased to provide this amount of testing, even if their cus-
tomers could afford the cost almost no-one could counte-
nance such a long delay in their project. 
Figure 2   The problem of testing a sufficient number of digital states to manage risks which are measured in ppm/year 
  
The above example is possibly unrepresentative of future 
mass-produced safety-related systems, such as the DRIVE 
PX 2 described in [10]. Assuming this to have eighteen 8-
bit digitized monochrome camera inputs, it would have 2144 
possible input states, which is 2103 more than the worked ex-
ample above. Even with “intelligent” digital testing tech-
niques giving a 10:1 reduction and just 10 nanoseconds per 
test, testing its input space alone with just one radiated fre-
quency, one angle of incidence and one antenna polarization 
would need a dwell time of more than 6·1026 years, (24/7). 
The author accepts that these are very crude worked ex-
amples, but nevertheless the huge difference between what 
would normally be considered a large but acceptable im-
munity test schedule for a safety-related system and the 
time required to perform basic immunity tests on the input 
space only, is more than enough to show that it is totally 
impractical to use immunity testing alone to demonstrate 
that EM disturbances should not create unacceptable func-
tional safety risks, for all but the very simplest digital sys-
tems. Figure 2 attempts to show this problem in a sketch. 
IV. THE EXPLODING EMC TEST PLAN  
Assuming that a design confidence of between 99.99% 
and 99.99999% is required as regards risks caused by EM 
disturbances over the entire lifecycle of a system, and as-
suming for the sake of argument that the problems dis-
cussed above have somehow been dealt with, the suite of 
immunity tests would have to be performed many times to 
simulate the following real-life situations:  
a) Reasonably foreseeable degradations and failures in 
each EMC-significant component or connection (e.g. con-
nector pins, solder joints, filter ground connections, etc.), 
throughout the entire lifecycle. These could be caused, for 
example, by: initial tolerances; aging; corrosion; use and 
misuse; wear; misassembly; counterfeit parts; tempera-
ture/pressure/humidity coefficients, and more. 
b) Foreseeable real-life EM disturbances in the sys-
tem’s intended operational environment that varied signifi-
cantly enough from the traditional immunity tests (e.g. 
modulation type/frequency, transient waveshape and/or rep-
etition rate, etc.) to warrant additional immunity tests. 
c) Foreseeable combinations of a) plus foreseeable 
combinations of b), during the lifecycle, for example: 
• Two or more radiated fields at different frequencies 
(any frequencies);  
• A radiated field at any frequency plus an ESD event at 
any location and any voltage;  
• A radiated field at any frequency plus a fast transient 
burst at any voltage;  
• A supply voltage at the low end of its tolerance plus 
harmonic distortion that reduces its peak height plus a 
dip, dropout or short interruption, etc. 
It very quickly becomes obvious that trying to cover all 
these reasonably foreseeable situations over the lifetime 
would create a "test plan explosion", as Figure 3 attempts to 
show.  Even if a digital system could possibly be immunity 
tested to the appropriate level of design confidence in a rea-
sonable time, and even if only 50 sets of tests could simu-
late a) above; 50 sets cover b), and 50 sets cover c), this 
would require the immunity tests to be repeated 150 times. 
And if, somehow, the cost was considered affordable, few 
could afford to wait that long! 
Figure 3   The problem of the exploding test plan 
  
Michel Mardiguian showed in [11] that when one EM 
disturbance is applied (e.g. a radiated RF field) the immuni-
ty of the equipment to another disturbance (e.g. fast transi-
ent bursts) can be seriously compromised. In his conclu-
sions he stated: “Speculating that all the worst EMI threats 
will appear at the same time on a given system would be ex-
travagant. But relying on the belief that certain EMI combi-
nations will never exist could be just as imprudent. Crude 
modeling, and a series of three simple tests are suggesting 
that within the frame of what has been simulated, the com-
bination of effects is a real risk.  ….for those applications 
where combined threats could happen, the product specifi-
cation or the test plan should require a greater EMC  
margin, to cover a possible simultaneous exposure.” 
V. EMC TEST STANDARDS DO NOT SIMULATE  
REAL EM ENVIRONMENTS WELL ENOUGH 
EMC test methods are designed for accuracy, repeatabil-
ity, and low cost – and may not simulate real life very well. 
For example: most radiated EM field immunity testing is 
done in anechoic chambers that create an environment un-
like every real-life situation (other than an aircraft or missile 
in free flight). In real life there will be one or more surfaces 
reflecting EM fields from a variety of angles. 
The waveforms used for fast transient burst, surge and 
electrostatic discharge testing are very simplified versions 
of the real-world EM disturbances they are supposed to rep-
resent. In some cases the test waveforms are defined by 
what test equipment can be manufactured at an affordable 
price. For example, fast transient burst (FTB) testing uses 
pulses with fixed amplitudes and a repetition rate of 5kHz, 
whereas the EM disturbances from the electro-mechanical 
contacts that the EFT/B test is intended to represent actually 
varies in frequency from MHz to kHz as the contact gap 
opens, with a rising amplitude as frequency decreases. 
Another example: electronic warfare and munitions EMC 
experts know that when an RF ‘threat’ is modulated at a 
frequency corresponding to the rate of electrical activity in 
the target equipment, the target’s susceptibility (vulnerabil-
ity) increases dramatically. Real-world sources of RF inter-
ference have a huge possible range of modulation frequen-
cies, but normal immunity testing (using IEC/EN 61000-4-3 
and IEC/EN 61000-4-6) uses only 1kHz sine-wave modula-
tion, while military and some other standards use 1kHz 
pulse-modulation, neither of which is certain to discover all 
possible responses of the tested equipment to real-life RF 
threats. The author has been involved with two situations 
where equipment passed tests with any 1 kHz sine-wave 
modulated frequency at 100 V/m, but were at least 80 dB 
more susceptible (i.e. to 10 millivolts/m) when the modula-
tion frequency was set to a circuit’s operating frequency. 
Both of these situations were discovered by accident be-
cause they were required to be tested with 1 kHz square-
wave (pulse modulation) and their especially-susceptible 
frequencies happened to lie very close to one of its harmon-
ics. Both used AC-energized sensors, and both would cause 
severe financial and/or safety problems if interfered with in 
normal operation. 
[12] makes the point that normal testing standards can 
give an erroneous impression of an equipment’s EM per-
formance in real life, due to the effects of load and tempera-
ture variations upon the inductors used in EMI filters. EMC 
testing standards usually test at just one setting of the 
equipment’s load – but it is well known that the levels of 
current flowing in the inductors of a filter will alter their in-
ductance values due to variations in permeability (and even 
saturation). EMC testing standards also test at just the nom-
inal value of the mains voltage – whereas higher or lower 
voltages will alter the currents in the supply filters’ induc-
tors and thereby alter their inductance values. Also, EMC 
testing standards only test at one ambient temperature – but 
it is well known that inductance varies with temperature.  
These variations will alter the characteristics of power fil-
ters, affecting the emissions and immunity of the equip-
ment. [13] gives the example of a variable-speed motor 
drive tested for emissions to IEC 61800-3, at 25°C and 
230Vrms with a light load on the motor. When retested at 
40°C, +10% supply voltage, and full load, the emissions 
from the variable speed drive were measured to be 20dB 
higher, indicating that the equipment’s supply filter’s per-
formance had fallen by 20dB. 
VI.   WHAT SHOULD BE DONE  
TO DEAL WITH ALL THESE TESTING PROBLEMS? 
The military have traditionally dealt with the above four 
problems by installing their safety-critical systems inside 
high-specification EM-mitigating (shielding, filtering, 
surge/transient suppression, fiber-optics, power supply 
backup, etc.) enclosures that are sufficiently rugged not to 
lose too much of their mitigation’s performance between 
maintenance intervals. As there seems to be no widely rec-
ognized name for this approach, the author calls it the “Big 
Grey Box” (BGB) method. Unfortunately, the BGB method 
is often considered to be too large, heavy or costly, or too 
dependent upon regular maintenance, for many modern 
safety-related systems using digital electronics. 
To deal with the inability to test all of the states of a 
modern digital system, industry and academia worldwide 
worked together for about 20 years to create IEC 61508, 
first published in 2000. This “IEC Basic Safety Publication” 
[14] is effectively a collection of well-proven practical 
techniques and measures for use in the design, verification, 
validation and independent assessment of functional safety-
related systems.  
Its design techniques and measures essentially detect er-
rors, malfunctions or failures in signals, data and power 
supplies which could cause an unacceptable level of risk, in 
real-time, during operation. When such a problem is detect-
ed, it is either corrected or the system is switched into a 
“safe state” quickly enough that safety risks are kept within 
acceptable levels.  
These design techniques and measures include: error de-
tection / correction coding of data; redundant channels with 
  
comparison or voting; redundant power supplies, and a 
range of other techniques which many designers have been 
very familiar with since well before IEC 61508 was first 
published in 2000.  
EMI actually means errors, malfunctions or failures in 
signals, data or power supplies as the result of EM disturb-
ances, which means that many of IEC 61508’s techniques 
and measures are quite effective at dealing with it. 
The upcoming new IEEE Standard on “Techniques and 
Measures to Manage Risks with Regard to Electromagnetic 
Disturbances” [3] will describe the Big Grey Box approach 
then go on to provide an alternative – identifying which of 
IEC 61508’s practical techniques and measures should be 
used in design and its verification and validation, what 
modifications they might need, and what new techniques 
and measures may also be required [15], to ensure that ac-
ceptable safety risk levels will not be exceeded by any rea-
sonably foreseeable EMI over the lifecycle.  
This alternative, practical approach to the BGB was first 
described in [16], and effectively means that any EMI 
which occurs because of EM disturbances outside the tested 
parameters, or because of any of the other problems dis-
cussed above, is detected by the system itself.  If the effects 
of the EMI could increase safety risks above acceptable lev-
els, they are either corrected, or the system is switched into 
one of its safe states, or switched to an unaffected back-up 
system. For more details, see [17]. 
All the work on this subject has been focused on func-
tional safety risks, but the same techniques and measures 
can also be used to manage any other kind of risk (e.g. fi-
nancial risk) – as long as the type of risk is identified and an 
acceptable level specified. 
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